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I -Introduction
The enormous body of literature on the Resource Curse provides several explanations for the detrimental effects of natural resources particularly on growth.
Among the persistent and rather robust explanations is the negative effect of real effective exchange rate appreciation due to the spending effect and subsequently the resources reallocation effect and its impact on the tradable sector.
The curse is a clear probability and a number of examples, in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, clearly indicate that context conditions have to be added to the equation when studying the exact mechanisms and transmission channels of the "curse". The curse does not strike in the same way in a country with sound institutions and good leadership as in a country with poor institutions and slack political economy environment. These contexts and conditions deserve differentiation and it is important to make a distinction between the pre-resource extraction conditions and environment, such as the general level of development and the political system and resource specific conditions, and their magnitude and relations between identity groups.
The theoretical challenge of a contextually sensitive study of the political economy of natural resources should capture complexity. This applies to dynamics and interplays between the context conditions as well as the direction and nature of the relationship. This calls for precise concepts; carefully formulated hypotheses that integrate complexity rather than simplify relationships. The political economy and the political dynamics seem to be as important as the Dutch Disease and probably in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa that is what matters the most, given their influence on the decision underlying the utilization of windfalls.
The resource curse or resource paradox is not unavoidable; a sound resource-led development strategy and well articulated and efficient public investment program (PIP) along with sound public finance management (PFM) will contribute to make a difference.
In the context of an oil boom or other mineral boom, the structure of the economy is fundamentally transformed; these changes, together with the revenues from oil exports, could set the stage for a sustained growth-path and economic development. Natural resource endowments have helped many countries (Norway, Malaysia, Botswana, Finland and Indonesia) to grow and diversify, in part by providing a basis for developing associated technologies and capital goods industries.
The governance aspect is equally important. Actually, fiscal and tax regimes, in other words, government's take on oil and mineral exploitation in Africa, are by no means uniform. A multitude of revenue extraction instruments or systems are currently in place in different countries in Africa from the government side to capture some of the benefits for the state and the public. It is therefore critical to understand the environment in the very beginning and early stages of the rent production or revenue chain by assessing the arrangements in place to eventually improve transparency throughout the revenue chain and by the same token improve efficiency and revenue allocation.
Once oil and mineral resources are secured, the next challenge is to ensure efficiency and sound allocation to promote the development process in general and poverty reduction in particular. This is done essentially through the national budget. The budget is the main vehicle and an active policy instrument in the hands of governments to promote their development strategy and poverty reduction programs through efficient allocation of resources to implement their medium-term development vision.
The immediate challenge often facing the authorities is to prepare a comprehensive development strategy to reduce poverty and foster broad-based economic growth. A well formulated and prioritized budget is critical in this regard. With substantial oil and mineral wealth, mineral-rich countries should be able to make rapid progress toward the development process and poverty reduction. Windfalls or oil and mineral rents are in principle channeled through the national budget, and should be integrated into the budget; therefore, the quality of budget execution matters.
Nonetheless, the quality of budget execution depends on the quality of budget preparation.
As a matter of improving the overall development performance of mineral-rich developing countries, the World Bank recently launched (on April 2008) the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Plus Plus (EITI++) initiative, which aims at helping developing countries, particularly African countries, manage and transform their natural resource wealth into long-term economic growth that spreads the benefits in the country.
The initiative is the perfect framework for mineral rich countries in Africa, provided that the initiative is successfully carried out.
The EITI++ in addition to improving transparency and accountability will rightly focus on the resource chain, including managing revenues and promoting sustainable and efficient utilization of natural-resource wealth. It could provide governments with a range of options including technical assistance and capacity building for improving the management of natural-resource-related wealth for the benefit of the overall economy and notably the implementation of good policies to promote sustained growth and poverty reduction.
The purpose of this conceptual framework is an attempt to provide a comprehensive approach that could contribute to address the resource paradox and promote sustained growth and hence durable poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It aims to draw from international experience, country specificities, SSA's context, and the very nature of natural-resource abundance. This could eventually support the EITI++ implementation.
II -Sub-Saharan Africa's Oil Exporting Countries' Sustained Growth Path: Setting the Stage
The common feature of all oil exporting countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is a noticeable lack 1 of a meaningful improvement in terms of poverty reduction, characterized by poor access to basic services and uneven overall development, despite enormous revenues accruing to governments since the mid-1960s and the early-1970s for some countries like Nigeria and Gabon. The boom and bust cycles are used often as a predicament for lack of investment predictability and steadiness given the volatility of oil prices and the dependence of SSA's oil exporting countries on oil revenues. Another characteristic common to all SSA's oil exporting countries is the significant level 2 of government revenue proportional to GDP (Fig.3 Traditional development theory since WWII has emphasized the very fact that the longrun rate of economic growth is largely dependent on the saving rate. Saving determines investment, and they reinforce each other-technological change is implicitly taken as a function of investment-and thus, the rate of capital accumulation, which is the basic determinant of long-run growth (Chakravarty 1993; Marglin and Schor 1990) . The notion that raising the investment rate is a key parameter to increasing long-run growth or sustained growth has been at the heart of growth thinking since David Ricardo.
Correlatively, a comfortable level of exports is critical in developing countries to sustain an adequate level of necessary imports. It is indispensable to import basic technology to break the supply side constraint and to modernize the structure of production. This is more so in SSA, which is characterized by a narrow export base and weak export performance. Thanks to oil exploitation in SSA's oil exporting countries, the level of exports to GDP is more than comfortable. In SSA's good oil exporting countries, overall export performance proportionally to GDP is an additional substantive advantage for their development financing toward a sustained growth path.
Industrial productivity in Tanzania, for example, was hampered by the weak capacity to export (Ndulu 1986; Devarajan, Easterly, and Pack 1999 Imports are indispensable inputs in developing economies; therefore, they should be treated explicitly as a factor of production in long-run growth models. Hence, the capacity to export, as a means to generate more foreign exchange resources, so as to finance the desired technology-embodied capital goods and to acquire advanced technology 9 from abroad, is fundamental for the structural transformation (Bochove 1982) . This backdrop meant to emphasize the critical importance of good export performance to fuel sound development financing as illustrated by Malaysia and Indonesia, which have been able to generate enough manufactured exports to fund continuing imports of the materials needed to sustain production. SSA's oil exporting countries could eventually put their countries on a sustained growth-path given their abundance of resources and export performance proportional to GDP.
Natural resource income raises national savings and hence facilitates capital accumulation and growth; thus, there are benefits of owning large natural resources.
There can be a huge spillover effect from the oil sector to the non-oil sector particularly if governments are committed to bridge the infrastructure gap and to promote the non-oil tradable sector and the non-oil economy as a whole. This is evidenced by the impressive real non-oil GDP growth from 1997 to 2008 in almost all SSA's oil exporting countries.
It is more the case for oil exporting countries where oil exploitation has been intensified, for example, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and to some extent Chad. This backdrop is not to suggest that SSA's exporting countries are on a sustained growth path -not yetinstead that there are good prospects and a credible potential; provided good economic policy implementation, including efficient resource allocation and sound public finance management to avoid wasteful utilization of resources (Fig.6 ).
( Another advantage of owning large natural resources and revenue is the positive impact they could have on the overall fiscal balance excluding grants (Fig.7) . The overall fiscal balance is an important aggregate which gives an indication of the ability or not of a government to finance its development spending without having to resort to excessive borrowing and official development assistance; although there is a cost to development and resorting to debt could be a wise investment decision. Nevertheless, large revenues from natural resources provide SSA's oil exporting countries with room to maneuver and much more development financing flexibility. Once again, the performance of SSA's oil exporting countries is noticeable compared to other SSA countries, including the continent's most successful countries, which are middle-income countries, like mineralrich Botswana or Namibia.
(Fig. 7)
Source: World Economic Outlook database, IMF.
III -Back to the Main Resource-Rich Macroeconomic Impediment: The Dutch Disease
The literature and theoretical thinking on the Resource Curse provide several explanations for the detrimental effects of natural resources particularly on growth.
Among the persistent and rather robust explanations is the negative effect of real effective exchange rate appreciation due to the spending effect and subsequently the resource reallocation effect and its impact on the tradable sector. Regardless of the multiplicity of resource paradox causality explanations, it seems that a full exploration of the issue remains to be undertaken in SSA to better understand the persistent overall poor development performance in oil and mineral-rich countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
As Richard Auty rightly pointed out, econometric results on the resource curse are contradictory. Sachs and Warner (1995 , 1997 found a detrimental impact of natural resource exports on growth, which they attributed to Dutch Disease. Acemoglu et al. (2001 Acemoglu et al. ( , 2002 Acemoglu et al. ( and 2004 found that the nature of institutions is more important than resources. Lederman and Mahoney (2007) query both results and argue that natural resource rents boost economic growth.
The Dutch Disease can be a real disease and a source of persistent slow growth, if there is something special about the sources of growth in manufacturing (decline in leading technological-knowledge sector) with production externalities or the learning-bydoing stressed by Matsuyama (1992) where he assumed that there are increasing returns to scale in manufacturing, but not in the resource sector. Hence an abundance of natural resource makes the economy specialize in the less dynamic sector of the economy; thus the economy loses the benefits of increasing returns to scale in manufacturing, which leads to a decline in growth.
In principle the Dutch Disease 10 can be seen as a matter of one sector benefiting partly at the expense of others, therefore it is not an impediment per se; however the disease is potentially harmful if there is something special about the reallocation of resources between sectors, for example from high-tech service industries to low primary production (Gylfason 2001). The oil boom would therefore induce a decline in a technologically leading sector of the economy with adverse consequences for long-term growth. The resource shift can then become a true disease (Sachs 2007 ).
The paradox effect of natural resource abundance on the economy is commonly described as an economy experiencing an export boom, and divided into three sectors:
(a) the booming export sector; (b) the lagging export sector -traditional exports -as the two traded good sectors; and (c) the non-traded goods sector, which essentially supplies domestic residents and might include retail trade, services and construction. In the presence of the Dutch Disease, the traditional export sector gets crowded out by the other two sectors (Corden and Neary in 1982) .
Abundant mineral resource-led exports lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate by shifting production inputs (capital and labor -resource movement effect 11 ) to the booming mineral sector and non-tradable sector (retail trade, service, and construction), thereby reducing the competitiveness of the non-booming sector (mostly agriculture and manufacturing) and hence participating in their collapse. The shift to the non-tradable sector accelerates domestic inflation 12 (the spending effect of the boom does increase the price of non-traded goods due to increased demand), which is responsible for the real exchange rate appreciation. These short-term macro-adjustment problems result in long-term effects on growth by reducing the country's economic diversity and increasing its reliance on exports from its natural resource sector.
Without discounting the robustness of the Dutch Disease transmission mechanisms above explained, it is however useful to go back to the original context of Dutch Disease and eventually to see how far the concept could possibly explain SSA's oil exporting countries' development impasse. Indeed, the term Dutch Disease refers to the fears of de-industrialization that gripped the Netherlands as a result of the appreciation of the Dutch currency that followed the discovery of natural gas deposits. The appreciation of the Dutch currency that followed the gas export boom reduced the profitability of manufacturing and service exports 13 . Total exports decreased markedly to GDP during the 1960s. Expansion of petroleum exports in the 1960s not only crowded out other exports, actually reduced other exports disproportionately and fueled the fears of dire consequences for Dutch manufacturing.
In fact based on existing data, SSA's oil exporting countries' manufacturing sector almost does not exist and where it does, like it is case of Nigeria, it is neither knowledge-driven nor globally competitive. It does not perform significantly better than the natural resources sector; therefore, the positive effects of linkages are negligible. This 11 The marginal productivity of labor in the booming industry will increase and attract labor away from the non-booming industry. This change in the sectoral composition of labor is called the resources movement effect of the boom (Corden, 1982 High non-oil growth rates were maintained throughout the two oil booms 17 , and at least some benefits from spending the oil income seem to have spread to most segments of the population, both rural and urban. Indonesian authorities undertook prudent macroeconomic policies, which at the time required significant expenditure cuts and correction of misaligned exchange rates in order to adjust to volatility in oil revenue.
Indonesia's experience with oil management stands out as relatively successful compared to other oil-exporting countries. The key factors that contributed to this success are as follows: oil was not the only source of export earnings and export of other commodities were generating considerable income; authorities did not rely on oil sector revenues alone and tried to diversify the economy; the Indonesian government adapted macroeconomic policies to changing external environment and was committed to a broad development strategy that emphasize raising rural income and resulted in an interrupted growth (Fig.9) for three decades and the severe Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s that dampened the economy was short-lived and further demonstrated the strength of Indonesia fundamentals, evidenced by its quick recovery. Good economic policies and institutional features combined with Indonesia's abundance of labor and non-oil resources as well as with technical changes in the food crop sector, which oil revenues helped to accelerate by financing the diffusion of improved techniques; together, they resulted in a distinctive pattern of growth and its economic performance stands out as being successful and today, Indonesia is considered as a successful emerging economy. The graph below (Fig.10 ) also shows that agricultural sector still accounts in average about 20 percent of the overall value added of Indonesia's economy and it has been the case since the late 1970s. In all accounts the Dutch Disease seems to be avoidable furthermore, a convincing case remains to be made in the case of SSA if the Dutch Disease is the main factor explaining the poor development performance of SSA's oil exporting countries.
Nigeria's case so far has been the most studied by scholars and development practitioners. The unanimous conclusion is so far that despite enormous revenues accruing to the government since the mid-1960s estimated in a cumulative basis about more than US$400 billion in 2007, the country development performance has been disappointing; and by the per capita GDP standard, Nigeria remains amongst the 15 poorest nations in the world for which such data are available. There is no doubt that one way or another, oil has had a detrimental impact on Nigerian development: But it is the Dutch Disease? Or it is all about political economy and the country context-curse?
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) provide evidence that suggests that Dutch
Disease is an inadequate explanation for Nigeria's growth performance. The waste explanation, on the other hand, appears to be overwhelming, with oil a key factor causing a whole series of pathologies that have led to the waste. It is not clear that relative price movements did in fact consistently disfavor the tradable sector even in the immediate aftermath of oil windfalls; relative price movements were not correlated with oil prices so that how oil windfalls were used rather than oil prices per se were more important in determining relative prices; in fact decision to keep official exchange rate appreciated, were to a greater extent related to the need to create rents, via the black market premium, at a time when oil revenues were in decline 18 . Although the role of the agricultural sector declined, it was offset by an increase in the size of the government sector in economic activity, and the poor performance of the latter may well be the most important for Nigeria's long-term economic decline. Beyond the erratic growth rate in contrast with Indonesia for the same period, the overall picture emerging from Nigeria is that the country has over-invested in physical capital and has suffered from poor productivity. Quality has suffered at the expense of quantity (Bevan et al 1998) . Another illustration or evidence about the quality of investment comes from capacity utilization in manufacturing, a substantial portion of which is government-owned. Capacity utilization, which averaged about 77 percent in 19 They were severe problems in administrating and coordinating programs and disbursements.
1975, started declining very quickly, to about 50 percent in 1983. Since the mid-1980s, capacity utilization has never exceeded 40 percent, and has languished at around 35 percent. In other words, two-thirds of the investment in manufacturing by the government is consistently wasted.
As Bevan et al (1998) noted, the oil windfalls enabled the government to substantially increase its expenditure and thus provided increased opportunity for kickbacks. In fundamental ways, the politics of Nigeria has been shaped by getting access to the revenues from oil. Successive military dictatorships have plundered oil wealth and created a huge civil service. Oil revenues financed the building of the famous Ajakouta steel complex in the 1970s, which is yet to produce a commercial ton of steel. To appease regional rivalries; steel-production capacity was divided among several locations of the country. However the decision behind the steel industry was noble as it was a specific manifestation of the drive for modernization and industrial self-reliance.
The Nigerian explanation shows that the complexity of country context matters in
Africa therefore should imperatively be taken into account, instead of quickly jumping to conclusion using the Dutch Disease cliché as the main explanation of the poor development performance of SSA's oil exporting countries; if we are to efficiently address the resource paradox issue and help Sub-Saharan African oil exporting countries, manage and transform their natural resource wealth into long-term economic growth that spreads the benefits into the country.
The political economy and the political dynamics seem to be more important than the Dutch Disease causality explanations and probably in the context of Sub-Saharan
Africa that is what matters the most, given their influence on the decisions underlying the utilization of windfalls. Transparency and accountability in the management of oil revenues are therefore critical as well as good economic policies, if these countries are to transform oil and minerals revenue into sustained growth-path and poverty reduction.
IV -Effectively Managing Boom and Bust Cycles
Besides the Dutch Disease, an alternative explanation of the curse puts the emphasis on volatility. Natural resources rents tend to be very volatile and volatility has been shown to be bad for growth, investment, income distribution, and poverty reduction 20 . Managing this volatility is challenging, much of the gain made in a boom unravels in the bust that follows; if not well managed boom and bust cycles can disrupt government development programs and poverty reduction spending.
Boom and bust cycles plague oil exporting 21 countries, given the importance of oil in the overall economy and in government revenues. The economic impact includes unpredictable revenue streams because widely fluctuating export revenues lead to fluctuating levels in overall government revenues (Mikesell 1997). These frequent upward or downward adjustments of fiscal expenditures are costly because they simultaneously discourage private investment and destabilize the government's budget, therefore impeding its ability to sustain investment and social provision and service deliveries (Katz et al. 2004 ). In addition, once expenditures become entrenched, it is harder for governments to make budget cuts; rather than reversing their spending patterns during busts, they often opt to borrow, and hence, risk incurring huge debt burdens.
Nigeria is a case in point, since the collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s. . 21 Although market volatility is a problem for all exporters of primary commodities, the phenomena is acute for oil exporting countries given the importance of oil in the overall economy. Fiscal policy has been the major factor behind the debt expansion during the period of oil price collapse and the subsequent collapse of the real GDP growth rate in 1981 -1983 (Fig. 11) . While the non-oil deficit was reduced substantially as a result of the sizeable public expenditure cuts (Fig. 12) , the drop in oil revenue as a result of the oil price collapse was much larger. Consequently, the average annual non-oil deficit for the period exceeded the average oil revenues by more than 50 percent of non-oil GDP. The First, a fund may be seen as able to stabilize budgetary revenues. When oil price is high, the fund would receive excess resources, which would then allocate to the budget when the price is low and therefore revenues. Second, a fund may be seen as a way to save some of the revenue generated by exploiting the finite stock of the resource, which can then provide income after it has been depleted. Funds may also be set up for other reasons such as to counteract the spending effect leading to the real exchange rate volatility and Dutch Disease, for liquidity and political economy purposes, and to enhance governance and transparency (Jeffrey Davis et al. 2001 ).
Norway, for example, has charted a long-run-oriented, tax-based and reasonably market friendly approach to the management of its oil resources. The oil revenue is 23 In 1982 and 1983, Nigeria accumulated commercial debt arrears for the first time and has been running arrears on its external debt ever since. Nigeria's arrears on external debt have been rescheduled in successive agreements with the London Club (1984, 1987, 1989 and 1992) and the Paris Club (1986, 1989, 1991, and 2000) . 26 Some countries have considered, or turned to the use of savings funds, which seek to create a store of wealth for future generation. This would allow the latter to benefit from part of the revenue arising from the depletion of exhaustible natural resources in the current period. bulk 27 of accruing oil revenues with the aim at increasing the return to private investment and raising the country growth rate, Takizawa, Gardner and Ueda (2004) . This result does not simply follow from the fact that marginal return on investment spending in these countries would be higher than the return on external financial assets. When the initial capital stock is low and government spending has positive externalities on production, the country would be better off spending more of its oil revenue upfront by increasing both return to private investment and the country's rate of growth. Hence, if oil revenue investment lead to long-term benefits (e.g.; health, education and infrastructure), then spending can permanently raise income, thus minimizing the tradeoff between current and future generations.
Managing revenue volatility is a tricky task; nevertheless, strengthening the fiscal 28 management, adopting clear rules of the game upfront, and improving transparency and accountability can help smooth the problem during the bust cycle.
Managing the bust cycle might be less an issue if revenues are well-managed during the boom period; therefore improving public finance management (PFM) should be a priority. Investing in the economy to the extent of the absorptive capacity could be a wise decision, to spread the natural resource wealth into the country and in other to increase the standard of living. Building up assets should also be a serious alternative depending of the magnitude of oil revenues and country absorptive capacities. floating around the government that it is easier to engage in unproductive rent-seeking activities to appropriate that wealth rather than in creating more wealth. Weak institutions may lead to wasteful spending or distorted allocation. It is widely recognized that the quality of political and economic institutions such as the type of property rights arrangements and the quality of state bureaucracy determines to a great deal whether natural resource rents will be managed to the benefit of the economy and society, this is clearly negatively evidenced by the disappointing case of Nigeria, in many regards. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2003) , demonstrate that, although the geography hypothesis emphasizes forces of nature as a primary factor in the poverty or prosperity of nations, the institutions hypothesis is about manmade influences. According to this view, some societies are organized in a way that upholds the rule of law;
V -Addressing Institutional Issues: Avoiding the Rent-Seeking-Disease in Sub-Saharan Africa's Oil Exporting Countries
encourages investment in machinery, human capital, and better technologies; facilitates broad-based participation in economic and political life by the citizens; and supports market transactions.
Three crucial elements of these organizational settings of good institutions are as follows: (i) Enforcement of property rights for a broad cross-section of society, so that a variety of individuals have incentives to invest and take part in economic life; (ii)
Constraints on the actions of elites, politicians, and other powerful groups so that these people cannot expropriate the incomes and investment of others in the society or create a highly uneven playing field; (iii) Providing some degree of equal opportunity for broad segments of the society, so that they can make investments, especially in human capital, and participate in productive economic activities Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004) and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) further demonstrated that economic institutions matter for economic growth because they shape the incentives of the key economic actors in society. In particular, they influence investments in physical and human capital and technology, as well as the organization of production. Although cultural and geographical factors may also matter for economic performance, differences in economic institutions are the major source of cross-country differences in economic growth and prosperity. 29 Economic institutions determine not only the aggregate economic growth potential of the economy but also an array of economic outcomes, including the distribution of resources in the future. That means they not only influence the size of the aggregate pie, but how this pie is divided among different groups and individuals in society. Therefore, the quality of leadership in SSA's oil exporting countries is critical to positively influence the rule of the game toward a sustained-growth-path, and poverty reduction; because political power-hence, country's leadership-determines economic institutions and policies.
There is now an international consensus on the critical necessity to strengthen governance, transparency, and accountability in oil and mineral rich countries for poverty reduction. Evidence has shown that with good institutions, large revenues generated from extractive industries enjoyed by some SSA countries can foster economic growth and reduce poverty; similarly, efficient management of government revenues and spendingpublic expenditure management-can have a profound impact on poverty reduction.
Ensuring sound and transparent institutions to adequately managing natural resource and more so in Sub-Saharan African's oil and mineral exporting countries is fundamental given their overall disappointing development performance in spite of their resource endowments.
The EITI++ initiative aims at addressing this critical issue. Further to improving transparency and accountability, the EITI++ is rightly focusing on the resource chain including managing revenues, and promoting sustainable and efficient utilization of natural-resource wealth. In fact, fiscal and tax regimes, in other words, governments' takes on oil and mineral exploitation in Africa are by no means uniform. A multitude of revenue extraction instruments or systems are currently in place in different countries in Africa from the government side to capture some of the benefits for the state and the public. It is therefore critical to understand the resource chain in the very beginning and early stages of rent production by assessing the arrangements in place to eventually 29 For a detailed framework, please see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004) .
improve transparency throughout the revenue chain and by the same token improve efficiency and revenue allocation for sustained growth and poverty reduction.
This conceptual framework suggests and promotes the review of all mechanisms and management arrangements related to oil and mineral revenues in every stage of the resource chain. However, to avoid political complications and given the sensitivity of the subject and to make the process more manageable, this framework suggests to stay away from contract negotiations process between government and international private oil companies, as well as from the adjudication of rights to extraction. Instead, it suggests to focus on assessing the overall oil and mineral wealth governance and management arrangements in place from the collection of taxes and royalties to sound and sustainable The objective is to help SSA's oil exporting countries to adequately manage their windfalls in a manner that spreads the benefits to the economy for sustained growth and poverty reduction, while avoiding undermining legitimate private corporate interests. This will require capacity building, economic policy advice and technical assistance.
The immediate challenge often facing authorities is to prepare a comprehensive development strategy to reduce poverty and foster broad-based economic growth. A well formulated and prioritized budget is critical in this regard. With substantial oil and mineral wealth, mineral-rich countries should be able to make rapid progress toward a sustained-growth-path and poverty reduction. In general the budget is the financial mirror of government policy. The preparation process is a powerful tool for coherence. The budget is both an instrument of economic management and an implicit policy statement, as it sets relative levels of spending and priorities for different programs and activities. In 30 The purpose here is to secure the source of revenues and to improve transparency in the revenue chain. however not sufficient by themselves for a sustained growth and durable poverty reduction: There is also a need to implement good economic policies.
VI -Transforming Oil and Mineral Rents into a Sustained Growth-Path and Durable Poverty Reduction in SSA
In the context of globalization, it is widely recognized that the rate at which a country grows is substantially determined by three factors: (a) the country's ability to integrate in the global economy through trade, investment and innovation (technological change); (b) its capacity to maintain sustainable government finances and a sound monetary policy; and (c) the country's ability to put in place an institutional environment in which contracts can be enforced and property rights can be established. In addition, in the context of developing countries, like is the case of SSA oil exporting countries;
because the country wealth is generated from the country economic structure, other things being equal, substantial additional income can be derived only from expanding the very structure of their economy 31 as productivity is improved. In other words, the pure consumption 32 of abundant oil and mineral resources cannot expand the production base needed for a sustained-growth-path, as no added value is created in the country, through the simple and pure consumption of oil windfalls.
It is critically important for SSA's oil exporting countries to start the process of climbing the value-chain ladder and progressively move into more manufacturing activities. This can be done by adopting and adapting existing technologies (abundant oil revenue can help) while adjusting to the global demand and international trade to limit their dependency on oil revenue, hence paving the way for a sustained growth, job creation and durable poverty reduction. The oil sector creates very few jobs; therefore the bulk of employment is inevitably from the non-oil economy. A rentier developing country which does not expand the structure of its economy condemns itself to an unsustainable permanent welfare society, unemployment and poverty circle.
The recent global food crisis for example demonstrates the vulnerability and the dependency of SSA countries on imported foods. Food constitutes by far the largest single item of household consumption in general. Oil proceeds can be invested in raising the productivity of farmers by financing improved seed variety for local production toward food security. This could also fuel job creation in rural areas.
In spite of its existing abundant-oil-wealth, Indonesia consistently invested in the food crop sector to promote technical changes in the food sector, which oil revenues helped to accelerate by financing the diffusion of improved techniques. Indonesia's pattern of growth and its economic performance stands out as being successful in many accounts and is considered today as a successful emerging economy, partly because of 31 Oil exploitation will create a temporally growth surge as the rent is spent. But this type of growth can only be short-lived if the non-oil economy is not developed; it could just be like manna from heaven and will generate inflation and high costs, which will make the situation even worst. 32 Particularly in the context of a depletable resource the overall situation may even be worse than the exante situation preceding the establishment of a "rentier" economy, once resources are depleted.
economic policy choices the country made. More than three decades later, the agriculture added value still accounts for about 20 percent of GDP (Fig.10 ) and the manufacturing sector has substantially improved. By contrast, the agriculture value added in percentage of GDP has considerably shrunk in SSA's oil exporting countries and in some cases tends to become meaningless 33 at best; as the oil sector grows ( Fig. 13 and 14) . It would have been a good news, if another non-oil sector of the economy was taking over, but it is far to be the case although the non-tradable sector seems to flourishing in Angola and Equatorial Guinea. The huge industrial value added contribution to GDP observed in Equatorial Guinea, Congo Republic, Gabon and Angola ( Fig. 13 and 14) only reflects the dependency of these countries on oil. To boost job creation, the non-oil economy and particularly the tradable sector need to be developed to ensure a durable poverty reduction. This has been clearly the case of Indonesia.
Cameroon (Fig 15) and Chad (Fig.17) have managed so far to keep a significant level of agriculture value added in percentage of GDP. For Cameroon, it means that the country is less dependent on the oil economy and confirms the country's status as being among the most diversified economies in SSA; however Cameroon is underperforming in many accounts compared to its potential and resource endowments. Cameroon could potentially do better in term of job creation and poverty reduction. In the 1970s and 1980s Cameroon and Indonesia were overall at about the same level of development. Cameroon was even doing better than Indonesia in terms of per capita GDP (Fig. 16 ). Today the structure and importance of Indonesia's economy are no longer comparable, although the per capita GDP is not that much divergent. Exceptionally noteworthy has been the strength of the non-oil tradable sector (agriculture and manufacturing including non-oil exports). The government was committed to a broad development strategy, that emphasizes raising rural income and was prepared to use key macro instruments to spread the absorption of windfalls over time and limit the impact of the oil booms on the non-oil tradable sectors; and strengthened agriculture sector, infrastructure and industry 35 . Today, the agriculture sector accounts for about 45 percent of total employment (Fig. 19 ) in average and the manufactures share of exports sector has overtaken the oil share of total exports (Fig.18 ). 34 Revenues from the oil boom in the 1970s were mostly used to expand public investment, in particular in rural development and human capital while mindful of absorptive capacity (IMF, 2006) . 35 For a full account of Indonesia's also see Gelb et al (1988) .
What is remarkable and unique in Indonesia's case and could be replicated to some extent in SSA oil exporting countries is that, much of the spending on infrastructure was used to fund labor-intensive public works projects and industry was not neglected in public investments. Twelve percent of domestically financed spending on development was allocated to capital participation. The industrial sector as a whole is estimated to have received almost 20 percent of development spending. Indonesia's investment in the economy could be characterized to have been massive and highly qualitative in stark contrast with Nigeria, where the focus was on the quantity in the expense of the quality, which led to wasteful spending. Indonesia's economic policies choices of the recent decades are reflected on its structure of exports and employment ( Fig. 18 and 19 ).
Indonesia has managed to develop the non-oil economy where jobs and value added of the economy are mostly created and has avoided the Dutch Disease.
( Fig. 19 Nigeria's experience shows that the solution is not simply to spend but to spend wisely and in a coordinated manner. Hundreds of billions of dollars have accrued from the oil sector in recent decades but unfortunately there is little to show for it in terms of poverty reduction and improved standards of living. Spending of oil receipts resulted in a short-term boom in growth (Fig. 11 ) but this was followed by low or even negative growth and massive accumulation of debt. Put differently, Nigeria saw a harmful pattern of boom and bust that locked its economy into a low-growth path. In the presence of mounting savings from the very recent oil boom, pressures are building up, particularly by state governments, to spend more given the tremendous existing needs for a stronger public infrastructure, particularly power, to support a growing private sector and to reduce poverty. Carefully crafted economy policy is essential to avoid past mistakes. This also holds for the other SSA oil and mineral exporting countries.
SSA oil exporting countries should be better off with a flexible capital expenditure program every five years, together with strict implementation monitoring made possible through an improved PFM/PEM system. This requires excellent budget preparation, execution, and monitoring. The flexible development planning will be done in such a manner that the countries could integrate the volatility of oil revenues. The proposed flexible capital expenditure program can be done, using the lowest oil priceper-barrel forecast as a baseline scenario. In the worst-case scenario, these countries could nevertheless implement the flexible capital expenditure program. And in the case where the prices forecast per barrel are more favorable, additional revenues generated will be carefully invested in priority sectors or transparently set aside.
The very recent oil boom presents these countries with a unique opportunity to invest massively and qualitatively to promote the non-oil sector necessary to catalyze the sustained growth process for a durable poverty reduction and more so for Nigeria because 36 A small population also means that the country is in a position to make rapid progress toward a full employment and durable poverty reduction, through wise absorption and investment of windfalls in the economy.
of its production sharing agreement contract 37 basis. It is time for SSA oil exporting countries like Gabon, Congo Republic and Cameroon to reorient their development policy and understand that oil revenues are an exceptional opportunity and not a renewable source of development financing. Therefore, they should take full advantage of that favorable situation to strengthen their public finance management in general, and their public expenditure management in particular and promote the non-oil economy for
Jobs creation and sustained-growth. They may also wish to plan their development process effectively and improve the efficiency of their public investment system. 37 The production sharing agreement contract is more sensitive to oil volatility and could possibly provide the government with significant revenues during the boom period.
VII -Conclusion
The purpose of this conceptual framework has been to put together a comprehensive approach that could contribute to address the resource paradox issue in oil and mineral exporting countries in Africa, while suggesting the strengthening of windfall management mechanisms and institutions, and the implementation of good economic policies toward a sustained growth-path and hence, job creation and durable poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan African oil and mineral exporting countries; drawing from the international experience, country specificities, SSA's context and the very nature of natural-resource abundance.
This conceptual-framework supports the World Bank's EITI++ initiative, which aims at helping developing countries, particularly African countries, manage and transform their natural resource wealth into long-term economic growth that spreads the wealth among the people. The World Bank's initiative is a much needed instrument and support for mineral rich countries in Africa, as it plans to provide governments with a range of options including technical assistance and capacity building for improving the management of natural-resource-related wealth for the benefit of the overall economy and notably the implementation of good policies to promote sustained growth and poverty reduction.
This conceptual framework demonstrates on one hand, through the case of Indonesia and the example of Norway that the resource paradox is avoidable and the abundance should not be a curse rather a blessing for SSA oil exporting countries. On the other hand, focusing on Nigeria, the conceptual framework equally emphasizes what not to do, and what went wrong in Nigeria although the desire to promote the country's development was persistent. Nigeria demonstrates to perfection that hasty spending and poor coordination, no matter how many billion of dollars are spent, is not the optimum solution: the quantity is useful but the quality of spending is crucial. Spending for the sake of spending is squandering valuable non renewable resources.
The oil sector directly generates very few jobs, the bulk of employment is consequently from the non-oil economy and the non-oil tradable sector; therefore good economic policies matter to transform rents into sustained-growth, hence job creation and durable poverty reduction. The capacity of policy formulation and execution in a coordinated way is thus fundamental. This has been clearly one of the missing pillars in the case of Nigeria. The country context and political economy matter a great deal but
should not be the main driving forces behind windfall management, to avoid excessive rent-seeking activities, inefficiency and wasteful spending; Norway is a case in point. The EITI++ implementation can contribute to make a difference, particularly through capacity building, implementation and coordination assistance.
